Abstract. Lightweight cryptographic primitives are essential for securing pervasive embedded devices like RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes. In this paper, we present a lightweight stream cipher WG-8, which is tailored from the well-known Welch-Gong (WG) stream cipher family, for resource-constrained devices. WG-8 inherits the good randomness and cryptographic properties of the WG stream cipher family and is resistant to the most common attacks against stream ciphers. The software implementations of the WG-8 stream cipher on two popular lowpower microcontrollers as well as the extensive comparison with other lightweight cryptography implementations highlight that in the context of securing lightweight embedded applications WG-8 has favorable performance and low energy consumption.
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging computing and communication paradigm in which smart devices (e.g., RFID tags, smart cards, wireless sensor nodes, etc.) are linked through both wired and wireless networks to the Internet. Those smart devices interact and cooperate with each other to conduct complicated tasks such as sensing the environment, interpreting the data, and responding to events. While the IoT provides new and exciting experience for end users, it also opens up new avenues to hackers and organized crime. Recent attacks to a wide range of smart devices [12, 39] have emphasized that without adequate security the IoT will only become pervasive nightmare.
The challenges for deploying security solutions for smart devices are threefold: 1) The overhead (i.e., the gate count in hardware or the memory footprint in software) of security solutions should be minimal due to the low-cost nature of smart devices; 2) The power consumption of security solutions should be minimal due to the low-power characteristic of smart devices; and 3) The performance of security solutions should be reasonable to support application and end-user requirements. To address the aforementioned challenges for securing smart devices, a new research direction called lightweight cryptography has been established which focuses on designing novel cryptographic algorithms and protocols tailored for implementation in resource-constrained environments.
A host of lightweight symmetric ciphers that particularly target for resourceconstrained smart devices have been proposed in the past few years. Early work focuses on optimizing hardware implementations of standardized block ciphers such as AES [16] , IDEA [25] and XTEA [22] . Later on, researchers have shown how to modify a classical block cipher like DES [24] for lightweight applications. Recent proposals deal with new low-cost designs, including lightweight block ciphers PRESENT [5] , KATAN/KTANTAN [6] , PRINTcipher [23] , LED [20] , and Piccolo [36] , lightweight stream ciphers Grain [21] , Trivium [7] , and MICKEY [3] , as well as a lightweight hybrid cipher Hummingbird/Hummingbird-2 [14, 15] . A good research survey about recently published lightweight cryptographic implementations can be found in [13] .
In this paper we present the stream cipher WG-8, which is a lightweight variant of the well-known WG stream cipher family [29] as submitted to the eS-TREAM project. WG-8 inherits good randomness properties of the WG stream cipher family such as period, balance, ideal two-level autocorrelation, ideal tuple distribution, and exact linear complexity. Moreover, WG-8 is able to resist the most common attacks against stream ciphers including algebraic attack, correlation attack, differential attack, cube attack, distinguish attack, discrete fourier transform attack, and time-memory-data tradeoff attack, thereby providing adequate security for lightweight embedded applications.
We also propose a couple for techniques for efficient implementation of the stream cipher WG-8 on two low-power microcontrollers, including an 8-bit microcontroller ATmega128L from Atmel and a 16-bit microcontroller MSP430 from Texas Instruments. Our experimental results show that WG-8 can achieve high throughput of 185.5 Kbits/s and 95.9 Kbits/s on the above two microcontrollers with energy efficiency of 458 nJ/bit and 125 nJ/bit, respectively. When compared to other lightweight cryptography implementations in the literature, the throughput of the WG-8 is about 2 ∼ 15 times higher and the energy consumption is around 2 ∼ 220 times smaller than those of most previous ciphers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the lightweight stream cipher WG-8. Subsequently, in Section 3 we analyze the security of the WG-8 against the most common attacks to stream ciphers. Section 4 describes efficient techniques for implementing the WG-8 stream cipher on low-power microcontrollers and reports our experimental results and comparisons with previous work. Finally, Section 5 concludes this contribution.
2 The Lightweight Stream Cipher WG-8
Preliminaries
We define the terms and notations that will be used to describe the lightweight stream cipher WG-8 and its architecture as well as to characterize its randomness and cryptographic properties.
-F 2 = {0, 1}, the Galois field with two elements 0 and 1. 
, the feedback polynomial of LFSR (which is also a primitive polynomial over F 2 8 ). }, where θ = ω 5 (i.e., a normal element) is used in this work. -Autocorrelation: The autocorrelation of a binary sequence with period T is defined as the difference between the agreements and disagreements when the symbol 0 maps to 1 and 1 maps to −1. If all the out-of-phase autocorrelation is equal to −1, then the sequence is said to have ideal two-level autocorrelation. -Linear span (LS): The linear span or linear complexity of a binary sequence is defined as the length of the smallest linear feedback shift register (LFSR) which generates the entire binary sequence. -Nonlinearity: The nonlinearity of a function f is defined as the minimum distance from f to any affine function with the same number of variables. -Algebraic immunity (AI): The algebraic immunity of a function f is defined as the minimum degree of an annihilator Boolean function g such that g is equivalent to either f or the complement of f (i.e., f g = 0 or (f + 1)g = 0). In the ideal case, the algebraic immunity of a function f is equal to the degree of f , thus making it immune to algebraic attacks. -⊕, the bitwise addition operator (i.e., XOR). -⊗, the multiplication operator over F 2 8 .
The Description of the Stream Cipher WG-8
WG-8 is a lightweight variant of the well-known Welch-Gong (WG) stream cipher family with 80-bit secret key and 80-bit initial vector (IV), which can be regarded as a nonlinear filter generator over finite field F 2 8 . The stream cipher WG-8 consists of a 20-stage LFSR with the feedback polynomial l(x) followed by a WG-8 transformation module with decimation d = 19, and operates in two phases, namely an initialization phase and a running phase. Initialization Phase. The key/IV initialization phase of the stream cipher WG-8 is shown in Fig. 1 .
Let the 80-bit secret key be K = (K 79 , . . . , K 0 ) 2 , the 80-bit IV be IV = (IV 79 , . . . , IV 0 ) 2 , and the internal states of LFSR be S 0 , . . . , S 19 ∈ F 2 8 , where S i = (S i,7 , . . . , S i,0 ) 2 for i = 0, . . . , 19. The key and IV initialization process is conducted as follows:
Once the LFSR is loaded with the key and IV, the apparatus runs for 40 clock cycles. During each clock cycle, the 8-bit internal state S 19 passes through the nonlinear WG-8 permutation with decimation d = 19 (i.e., the WGP-8(x 19 ) module) and the output is used as the feedback to update the internal state of the LFSR. The LFSR update follows the recursive relation:
After the key/IV initialization phase, the stream cipher WG-8 goes into the running phase and 1-bit keystream is generated after each clock cycle.
Running Phase. The running phase of the stream cipher WG-8 is illustrated in Fig. 2 . During the running phase, the 8-bit internal state S 19 passes through the nonlinear WG-8 transformation with decimation d = 19 (i.e., the WGT-8(x 19 ) module) and the output is the keystream. Note that the only feedback in the running phase is within the LFSR and the recursive relation for updating the LFSR is given below:
The WG-8 transformation module WGT-8(x 19 ) comprises of two sub-modules: a WG-8 permutation module WGP-8(x 19 ) followed by a trace computation module Tr(·). While the WGP-8(x 19 ) module permutes elements over F 2 8 , the Tr(·) module compresses an 8-bit input to 1-bit keystream.
Randomness Properties of the WG-8 Keystream
The keystream generated by the stream cipher WG-8 has the following desired randomness properties [17] : 
Cryptanalysis of the Stream Cipher WG-8
In this section, we analyze the security of the stream cipher WG-8 under the context of lightweight embedded applications.
Algebraic Attack
The algebraic attack is a powerful attack against LFSR based filtering sequence generators [10] . The goal of the algebraic attack is to form a lower degree multivariate equation by multiplying the filtering function by a low-degree multivariate polynomial. This gives an overdefined system of nonlinear equations for sufficiently many keystreams, which can be solved to recover an internal state of the LFSR. The algebraic immunity of the WGT-8(x 19 ) is equal to 4. According to the algebraic attack, the time complexity and the data complexity for recovering the internal state of the LFSR are about 
= 2
24.65 , respectively. For applying the fast algebraic attacks [9] to the stream cipher WG-8, one needs to respectively find two multivariate polynomials g and h of degree e and d (e < d) such that f · g = h. For the WGT-8(x 19 ) and e = 1, there does not exist a multivariate polynomial h in 8 variables with degree less than 7. Hence, in order to launch the fast algebraic attack one needs to obtain more keystream bits with a higher complexity. For lightweight embedded applications, it is hard for an attacker to obtain about 2 24 .65 keystream bits. Even the attacker can get those many bits for a fixed key and IV, he needs to perform the operations with the time complexity 2 66.0037 , which completely defeats this attack.
Correlation Attack
In the correlation attack, the objective of an attacker is either to find a correlation between a keystream and an output sequence of an LFSR or to find a correlation among the keystreams [8, 27, 37] . The stream cipher WG-8 is secure against the correlation among the keystreams as it produces keystreams with 2-level autocorrelation. We now consider the fast correlation attack in which the keystream of the stream cipher is considered as a distorted version of the LFSR output. In the fast correlation attack, the linear approximation of WGT-8(x 19 ) can be used to derive a generator matrix of a linear code that can be decoded by a maximum likelihood decoding (MLD) algorithm. Letting f (x) be a linear function in 8 variables, we have Pr(WGT-8(
= 0.578125. Applying the results of [8] for t = 3, the amount of keystream (denoted by N ) required for the attack to be successful is given by N ≈ (k · 12 · ln 2)
and the decoding complexity is given by
f (x)) − 0.5) = 0.078125 and k is the number of LFSR internal state bits recovered. If we choose a small value of k (e.g., k = 7), the number of bits required to launch the attack is about 2 60.31 , which is not possible in practice. Similarly, if we choose a large value of k (e.g., k = 80), the number of bits required to mount the attack is about 2 37.15 . However, the decoding complexity of the attack is approximately 2 102.68 , which is worse than the exhaustive search. Hence, the stream cipher WG-8 is secure against the fast correlation attacks.
Differential Attack
The initialization phase in the first design of the WG stream cipher was vulnerable to the chosen IV attack [40] , where an attacker can distinguish several output bits by constructing a distinguisher based on the differential cryptanalysis. This weakness has been fixed in the later design by placing the WG permutation module at the last position of the LFSR [29] . For the proposed stream cipher WG-8, the differential distribution of the WGP-8(x 19 ) is 8-uniform, which provides a maximum 2 −5 possibility for differential characteristic. During the initialization phase the WGP-8(x 19 ) is applied for 40 times. Thus, after the initialization phase, it would be hard for an attacker to distinguish the output keystream because the differentials will become complex and contain most key/IV bits.
Cube Attack
Cube attack [11] is a generic key-recovery attack that can be applied to any cryptosystem, provided that the attacker can obtain a bit of information that can be represented by a low-degree decomposition multivariate polynomial in Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of the secret and public variables of the target cryptosystem. Note that the nonlinearity of WGP-8(x 19 ) is 92 and the algebraic degrees of the component functions of WGP-8(x 19 ) are 7. Moreover, the ANF representations of 8 component functions contain 133, 113, 146, 124, 137, 109, 122, and 120 terms, respectively, and only the ANF of the second component contains 7 linear terms and other terms are of degree greater than or equal to 2. In the WG-8 stream cipher, after 40 rounds of the initialization phase, the degree of the output polynomial can be very high. As a result, it would be hard for an attacker to collect low-degree relations among the secret key bits.
Distinguishing Attack
Recently, a distinguishing attack has been proposed against the stream cipher WG-7 [30] . Due to the small number of tap positions in the LFSR of the WG-7, the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR allows an attacker to build a distinguisher for distinguishing a keystream generated by WG-7 from a truly random keystream. For the WG-8 cipher, the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR consists of 8 tap positions and a similar distinguisher as in [30] can be built as
which is a Boolean function in 64 variables. For the distinguisher F , the probability Pr(F (x) = 0) = 1 2 ± , where x = (a 0 , ..., a 7 ), a i ∈ F 2 8 . Note that the value of will be quite small due to a huge number of variables in the distinguisher, which requires an attacker to obtain more keystream bits for distinguishing the keystream. However, the computation of the exact value of is infeasible in this case because the number of possible values of x is 2 64 . Hence the WG-8 stream cipher is resistant to the distinguishing attack. Note that this type of distinguishing attacks can also be extended to the case that a distinguisher can be built using a linear relation of a remote term of the LFSR, say S τ for not large τ , and the sequences addressed in a subset of tap positions of the LFSR, denoted by I = {i 1 , · · · , i t } ⊂ {0, 1, · · · , 19}. In other words, a distinguisher could be built using the linear relation S i+τ = S i1 + · · · + S i+it . Since this property is controlled by the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR, it can be easily teared done by a proper selection of the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR. For our selection of the characteristic polynomial l(x), there is no remote term S τ for 20 ≤ τ ≤ 2 34 for which the size of set I is less than 5. Thus, the WG-8 stream cipher is also resistant to this general distinguishing attack.
Discrete Fourier Transform Attack
The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) attack is a new type of attack to recover the internal state of a filtering generator, which was first proposed by Rønjom and Helleseth in [34] and extended to attacking filtering generators over F 2 n by Gong et al. in [19] . For mounting the DFT attack against the WG-8 stream cipher, an attacker needs to obtain 2 33.32 (i.e., the linear complexity) consecutive keystream bits. Hence, the online complexity of this attack for recovering the internal state is O(2 33.32 ), after an offline computation with complexity O(2 48.49 ).
For typical lightweight embedded applications like RFID systems, a reader and a tag only exchange 32-bit random numbers in each communication session. Hence, an attacker can never obtain 2 33.32 consecutive keystream bits.
Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff Attack
The Time-Memory-Data (TMD) tradeoff attack [4] is a generic cryptanalytic attack that is applicable to any stream cipher, especially those with low sampling resistance. The complexity of the TMD tradeoff attack is O(2 n 2 ), where n is the size of the internal state. For the WG-8 stream cipher, the size of the internal state is 160-bit and thus the complexity of launching a TMD attack is O(2 80 ). Moreover, the sampling resistance of the WG-8 stream cipher is high due to the usage of the WGT-8(x 19 ) as the filtering function. The ANF representation of the WGT-8(x 19 ) contains 109 terms, among which only four terms are linear and other terms have degree greater than 2 and less than 8. Hence, only by fixing 7 out of 8 variables can one obtain a linear equation.
Efficient Implementation of the Stream Cipher WG-8
In this section, we describe efficient techniques for implementing the WG-8 stream cipher on two low-power microcontrollers. For each platform we provide three implementation variants that deal with trade-offs among speed, code size, and energy consumption.
Implementation of the WG-8 Permutation Module WGP-8(x
19 )
The most complicated WGP-8(x 19 ) module can be implemented using three methods: a) a 256-byte direct look-up table; b) a 34-byte coset leader based look-up table; or c) tower field (TF) arithmetic. Table ( Coset Leader Based Look-up Table ( CLT) Approach. This approach assumes that a normal basis is used to represent elements in F 2 8 and uses the essential property of the WG-8 permutation with decimation d below:
Directly Look-up
for x ∈ F 2 8 and i = 0, 1, . . . , 7. According to the Equation (1) 
Coset Leader
Coset Coset Leader Coset 0x00 -------0x27 0x4E 0x9C 0x39 0x72 0xE4 0xC9 0x93 0x01 0x02 0x04 0x08 0x10 0x20 0x40 0x40 0x2B 0x56 0xAC 0x59 0xB2 0x65 0xCA 0x95 0x03 0x06 0x0C 0x18 0x30 0x60 0xC0 0x81 0x2D 0x5A 0xB4 0x69 0xD2 0xA5 0x4B 0x96 0x05 0x0A 0x14 0x28 0x50 0xA0 0x41 0x82 0x2F 0x5E 0xBC 0x79 0xF2 0xE5 0xCB 0x97 0x07 0x0E 0x1C 0x38 0x70 0xE0 0xC1 0x83 0x33 0x66 0xCC 0x99 ----0x09 0x12 0x24 0x48 0x90 0x21 0x42 0x84 0x35 0x6A 0xD4 0xA9 0x53 0xA6 0x4D 0x9A 0x0B 0x16 0x2C 0x58 0xB0 0x61 0xC2 0x85 0x37 0x6E 0xDC 0xB9 0x73 0xE6 0xCD 0x9B 0x0D 0x1A 0x34 0x68 0xD0 0xA1 0x43 0x86 0x3B 0x76 0xEC 0xD9 0xB3 0x67 0xCE 0x9D 0x0F 0x1E 0x3C 0x78 0xF0 0xE1 0xC3 0x87 0x3D 0x74 0xF4 0xE9 0xD3 0xA7 0x4F 0x9E 0x11 0x22 0x44 0x88 ----0x3F 0x7E 0xFC 0xF9 0xF3 0xE7 0xCF 0x9F 0x13 0x26 0x4C 0x98 0x31 0x62 0xC4 0x89
0x2A 0x54 0xA8 0x51 0xA2 0x45 0x8A 0x57 0xAE 0x5D 0xBA 0x75 0xEA 0xD5 0xAB 0x17 0x2E 0x5C 0xB8 0x71 0xE2 0xC5 0x8B 0x5B 0xB6 0x6D 0xDA 0xB5 0x6B 0xD6 0xAD 0x19 0x23 0x64 0xC8 0x91 0x23 0x46 0x8C 0x5F 0xBE 0x7D 0xFA 0xF5 0xEB 0xD7 0xAF 0x1B 0x36 0x6C 0xD8 0xB1 0x63 0xC6 0x8D 0x6F 0xDE 0xBD 0x7B 0xF6 0xED 0xDB 0xB7 0x1D 0x3A 0x74 0xE8 0xD1 0xA3 0x47 0x8E 0x77 0xEE 0xDD 0xBB ----0x1F 0x3E 0x7C 0xF8 0xF1 0xE3 0xC7 0x8F 0x7F 0xFE 0xFD 0xFB 0xF7 0xEF 0xDF 0xBF 0x25 0x4A 0x94 0x29 0x52 0xA4 0x49 0x92 0xFF
Algorithm 1 Coset Leader Based Look-up Table Approach
Input:
1: if x = 0x00 or x = 0xFF then 2: return x 3: end if 4: Find the coset leader xc of x by cyclically shifting x to the right by i positions, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 (i.e., xc is the smallest odd integer in the coset containing x.) 5: Find the position j of xc being in the table T Co-WGP-8 6:
Tower Field Arithmetic (TFA) Based Approach. The software implementation of the WGP-8(x 19 ) module involves the arithmetic (i.e., addition, multiplication, and exponentiation) over finite field F 2 8 . Although we can directly implement all the operations over F 2 8 , it is well known that using the isomorphic tower constructions of F 2 8 might save the memory consumption. Therefore, we investigate the tower construction F (2 4 ) 2 in this work.
Tower Construction F (2 4 ) 2 and Its Arithmetic. To obtain the tower construction F (2 4 ) 2 , we first construct F 2 4 by using an irreducible polynomial e(X) of degree 4 over F 2 , and then construct F (2 4 ) 2 by using a certain irreducible polynomial f (X) of degree 2 over F 2 4 . In our tower construction, we use e(X) = X 4 +X 3 +1 with its polynomial basis {1, α, α 2 , α 3 } for F 2 4 and f (X) = X 2 + X + α with its normal basis {β, β 16 } for F (2 4 ) 2 , where α = ω 119 ∈ F 2 4 and β = ω 7 ∈ F (2 4 ) 2 are zeros of the polynomials e(X) and f (X), respectively. 
Arithmetic operations in
We can perform the arithmetic in F 2 4 as follows:
where c = (a 0 ⊕ a 1 )(b 0 ⊕ b 1 ). For a non-zero element A ∈ F (2 4 ) 2 , the squaring of A is calculated as follows:
The Frobenius mapping of A with respect to F 2 4 , which is the 16 th power operation, is computed as follows:
Implementation of WGP-8(x 19 ) Module. For an element x ∈ F 2 8 , the WGP-8(x 19 ) can be computed as follows:
where
Note that for the tower construction F (2 4 ) 2 , 1 can be denoted by the vector (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) . Therefore, the addition with 1 under the TF representation is equivalent to XORing with a constant 0x88.
Implementation of the Trace Computation Module Tr(·)
Depending on the bases chosen, the trace of an element x ∈ F 2 8 can be computed as shown in Table 4 .2. Normal Basis x0θ + x1θ 2 + · · · + x7θ
Implementation of the Multiplication by ω Module
The multiplication by ω module can be implemented using either finite field arithmetic or an 8 × 8 look-up table.
Multiplication by ω Using Finite Field Arithmetic We consider the following three cases when the PB, NB, and TF are used to represent finite field elements, respectively. With the PB representation, the multiplication of an element x ∈ F 2 8 by ω can be computed as follows:
Therefore, the result of x·ω is represented as an 8-bit vector (x 7 , x 0 , x 1 ⊕x 7 , x 2 ⊕ x 7 , x 3 ⊕ x 7 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 ) with respect the PB.
With the NB representation, the multiplication of an element x ∈ F 2 8 by ω can be calculated as follows:
where the matrix M is given below. With the TF representation, the multiplication of an element x ∈ F 2 8 by ω can be calculated as follows:
where the matrix M is given below. 
Multiplication by ω Using Look-Up Tables Based on the Equations (2) - (4), one can generate 256-byte look-up tables with respect to the chosen bases.
Implementation Platforms and Development Tools
In this section, we briefly describe two low-power microcontrollers for implementing the WG-8 stream cipher as well as the corresponding development tools. 
8-Bit Microcontroller

Experimental Results and Comparisons
In this section, we report our experimental results for implementing the stream cipher WG-8 on the low-power microcontrollers ATmega128L and MSP430F1611 and compare our results with other lightweight-cryptography implementations on the same or similar platforms. We focus on three major performance criteria for implementing cryptographic primitives on resource-constrained environments, namely throughput, code size, and energy consumption (i.e., energy/bit). Table 3 compares our implementation results with previous work in terms of the aforementioned three performance criteria. Note that we estimate the per bit energy consumptions by the formula: energy/bit = Supply Voltage×Current×Cycles Clock Frequency×Number of Bits , which is based on the typical current consumption of a low-power microcontroller for the given clock frequency and supply voltage.
From Table 3 , we note that on 8-bit ATmega microcontrollers the throughput of WG-8 is about 2 ∼ 15 times higher than that of stream ciphers Grain, Trivium, Salsa20, and WG-7, block ciphers PRESENT-80 and XTEA as well as the hybrid cipher Hummingbird, whereas the energy consumption of WG-8 is around 2 ∼ 220 smaller than that of those ciphers. Moreover, WG-8 has the comparable throughput and energy efficiency with the hybrid cipher Hummingbird-2 (optimized with assembly language). On the 8-bit platform, WG-8 is less efficient than AES in terms of throughput and energy consumption. The main reason is that WG-8 is a bit-oriented stream cipher whereas AES is a block cipher with block size 128-bit. Furthermore, the code size of WG-8 is medium and the SRAM usage of WG-8 is small among all the lightweight implementations. On 16-bit MSP430 microcontrollers, the throughput of WG-8 is about 1 ∼ 20 times higher than that of the stream cipher WG-7 as well as block ciphers PRINTcipher-48, AES, PRESENT-80, and KLEIN-64, whereas the energy efficiency is comparable with that of those ciphers. While WG-8 has similar throughput and energy efficiency as the hybrid cipher Hummingbird, it is less efficient when compared to the Hummingbird-2 cipher. The main reason comes from the optimization with the assembly language in the speed-optimized Hummingbird-2 implementation. Furthermore, the code size of WG-8 is about 2 ∼ 7 times smaller than block ciphers PRINTcipher-48, AES, PRESENT-80, and KLEIN-64 as well as the hybrid cipher Hummingbird-2, and is comparable with the Hummingbird cipher. Regarding to the SRAM usage, the stream cipher WG-8 is superior to other block cipher and stream ciphers.
In addition, for the three implementation variants, we note that on both 8-bit and 16-bit platforms the DLT method is consistently better than both CLT and TFA methods with respect to throughput and energy consumption. The reason lies in the efficient memory access for look-up tables on both microcontrollers.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a lightweight stream cipher WG-8 targeted for resourceconstrained devices like RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes, which inherits all the good randomness and cryptographic properties of the well-known WG stream cipher family. A detailed cryptanalysis shows that WG-8 is resistant to the most common attacks against stream ciphers. Moreover, the software implementations on low-power microcontrollers demonstrate the high performance and low energy consumption of the WG-8 stream cipher, when compared to most of previous block ciphers and stream ciphers. Therefore, the stream cipher WG-8 is a competitive candidate for securing pervasive embedded applications.
